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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ROMIE H. MILLER III, App. No. 20030680 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment from jury trial proceedings on July 29 and 30, 2003. 
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 77-18a-1 and § 78-2a-3 Utah 
Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at the suppression hearing on May 7, 
2003 in finding that Defendant had abandoned his briefcase in a semi tractor at the parking lot 
of C.R. England on September 20, 2002. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at the suppression hearing on May 7, 
2003 in finding that the search of Defendant's briefcase conducted by Officer Cliristopher Smith 
of the West Valley Police Department on September 20, 2002 did not exceed the scope of the 
1 
private search of said briefcase performed by C.R. England employees. 
3. Whether the trial court was correct in holding that the evidence obtained through 
the warrantless search of Defendant's briefcase should not be suppressed. 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Defendant 
possessed legal adult pornography under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) and whether it 
scrupulously examined that evidence in the exercise of its discretion. 
5. Whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-5a-3 is unconstitutionally overbroad on its 
face. 
6. The applicable standard of appellate review is "clearly erroneous" on issues of fact 
before the assigned judge at the suppression hearing. State v. Thurman 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Sepulveda 842 P.2d 913 (Ut. App. 1992). 
7. The applicable standard of appellate review is "abuse of discretion" on issues of 
admitting evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). State v. Holbert, 37 P.3d 1073 (Ut. App. 
2002). In addition, the record is reviewed to determine whether the evidence of other acts was 
"scrupulously examined" by the trial court in the exercise of that discretion. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, P.3d 1120 (Utah 2000). 
8. The applicable standard of appellate review is "correctness" on issues of the trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusions for denying a motion to suppress. State v. Sepulveda 842 P.2d 
913 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). 
9. The applicable standard of appellate review is "correctness" on issues of the 
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unconstitutionality of a statute for being overbroad or vague. Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution; Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; 
2. Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution; Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution; 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, 404. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant was a contract truck driver for C.R. England trucking company of Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Defendant parked his semi tractor at the parking lot of C.R. England on 
September 20, 2003. The tractor's lease had expired, and Defendant was in the process of turning 
in the old truck and picking up a new leased tractor. Brandon Harris, an employee of C.R. 
England, got spare keys for the tractor from the parts room and pulled the tractor inside the 
building to begin a routine inspection for the termination of a lease, (transcript, pp. 21-27; 27-32; 
record pp. 89-91). 
2. Upon inspecting the tractor, Harris discovered a briefcase in the sleeper 
compartment. The briefcase had latches with combination locks and bands of strapping tape to 
keep it closed, (transcript, pp. 32-34; record pp. 89-91; transcript p. 75, line 19; record p. 91 
paragraph 24). Harris opened the briefcase and discovered what he believed to be child 
pornography, (transcript, pp. 32-34; record pp. 89-91). 
3. Harris contacted his supervisor, Jay Timothy, who took the briefcase to Carrie 
Johansen, the human resource manager for C.R. England. Johansen also looked inside the 
briefcase and saw what she believed to be child pornography. Johansen shut the briefcase and 
called the West Valley City Police Department, (transcript pp. 37-40; record p. 90). 
4. Officer Christopher Smith of the West Valley City Police Department came to 
Johansen's office at C.R. England. Officer Smith opened the briefcase and examined its contents. 
Smith then seized the container and its contents, and booked them into evidence, (trial transcript 
pp. 43-46; record pp. 90- 91). 
5. This matter came for a suppression hearing on May 7, 2003, before the Honorable 
Michael K. Burton. At that hearing, Defendant moved the Court to suppress any and all 
photographic images or other papers located in Defendant's briefcase on the grounds that luggage 
is an area in which courts have recognized an expectation of privacy against government intrusion 
into papers and effects, absent a warrant or an exigency, (record pp. 60-70). That motion was 
denied, (record pp. 93-94). 
6. The prosecution had moved on July 17, 2003 to admit evidence of Defendant's 
other acts of possessing legal pornography under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). (record pp. 106, 
107; 120-130). Defendant objected to this motion, and the issue of whether such evidence would 
be admissible at trial was reserved for trial. 
7. The testimony of Officer Smith and the items seized from Defendant's briefcase 
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were admitted into evidence at the trial on July 29 and 30, 2003. (transcript pp. 46,47; State's 
Exhibits 1-157) 
8. At trial, the prosecution also submitted evidence as State's Exhibit 163 and 164 
that Defendant possessed adult pornography under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show for what 
purpose Defendant possessed child pornography, (transcript pp. 126-128). 
9. Defendant was convicted of all counts charged, (transcript p. 199). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that Defendant's briefcase was abandoned in a truck 
leased to Defendant and parked in the yard of C.R. England. The fact that the briefcase was found 
temporarily out of Defendant's possession and control or that Defendant may have inadvertently 
left his briefcase behind for a short time does not dispense with the Fourth Amendment 
requirements. Under the totality of the circumstances at the relevant place and time, Officer 
Christopher Smith may have been entitled to seize the briefcase after speaking with C.R. England 
employee Carrie Johansen, but he should have obtained a search warrant before searching 
Defendant's briefcase. The introduction of State's Exhibit 163 and 164 at trial was not sufficiently 
probative on the issue of whether Defendant had committed the crimes charged in light of their 
prejudicial effect. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5a-3 is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 
FIRST ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that Defendant's briefcase was abandoned in a 
truck leased to Defendant and parked in the yard of C.R. England. The fact that the 
briefcase was found temporarily out of Defendant's possession and control or that 
Defendant may have inadvertently left his briefcase behind for a short time does not dispense 
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with requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Abandonment of a legitimate privacy interest is an exception to the warrant requirement, 
and the burden is on the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception exists 
in a particular case. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Ut. App. 1992); State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 736 (Ut. App. 1992). The trial court 
must make adequate findings to permit the review of the issue of abandonment of any privacy 
interest in luggage. State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Ut. App. 1990). 
Under Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) no warrantless search is lawful per se if the 
accused manifested a subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the object searched. The 
analysis of Katz also asks whether the subjective expectation of privacy by the accused is also 
reasonable from an objective standard. 
One cannot, however, manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item once it has 
been abandoned. "The accused need not have abandoned the searched item in the strict property 
sense, when an intent to relinquish ownership must be shown; merely an intent voluntarily to 
relinquish his privacy interest is sufficient. A defendant has abandoned his reasonable expectation 
of privacy when he leaves an item in a public place." State v. Rynhart 2003 Ut. App. 410 (Filed 
November 28, 2003), quoting United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85 (5th Cir.1994). A person is 
considered to have abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy when they fail to come 
forward within a short, but reasonable time to claim their property. United States v. Ramapurairu 
632F.2d 1155 (4lh Cir. 1980). 
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In the case at bar, the Defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by keeping 
his briefcase in the sleeper compartment of the truck that was leased to him, closing his briefcase, 
and sealing it with bands of tape, (transcript p. 33, lines 11,12; record pp. 89-92). The 
Defendant's lease on the truck had expired before September 20, 2002, but he had not clearly 
relinquished possession of die truck when the briefcase was discovered: i.e. Brandon Harris 
pulled Defendant's truck into the bay about 1:25 p.m. on September 20, 2002. After pulling the 
truck into the bay at 1:25 p.m. and before taking a fifteen minute break at 1:30 p.m., Harris saw 
Defendant going through the truck, collecting Defendant's personal property. Harris came back 
from his break approximately 1:45 p.m. and immediately began his inventory of the truck, finding 
Defendant's briefcase, (transcript p. 28, line 19; p. 30, line 20; p. 31, lines 20-23; p. 32 lines 
1-20). 
Under the totality of these circumstances, it is not reasonable to conclude that Defendant 
had relinquished his subjective expectation of privacy or that the subjective expectation of privacy 
he had demonstrated was not objectively reasonable. Defendant did not abandon this vehicle on 
a roadway, other public place, or flee from the vehicle. See State v. Rynhart, 2003 Ut. App. 410 
(Filed November 28, 2003). Rather, Defendant was still in the act of retrieving his effects from 
the vehicle after Harris pulled the truck into the bay to begin his inspection. If the Defendant had 
in fact left the vehicle with his effects remaining in it before Harris found the briefcase, it was 
only for a matter of moments. Further, Harris had seen the Defendant removing his effects from 
the truck and recognized him as one of the company drivers, (transcript p. 31). Defendant 
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therefore contends that the relevant parts of the totality of the circumstances are as follows: 
• Harris had seen Defendant in the act of retrieving his effects from a vehicle leased 
to him after Harris pulled the truck into the bay; 
• Harris recognized Defendant as one of the drivers and therefore knew whose 
effects the truck contained; 
• Defendant had only been away from the truck for moments when Harris found the 
briefcase. 
The foregoing demonstrates that Defendant's expectation of privacy in the briefcase was 
still objectively reasonable at the time C.R. England employees took possession of it. A person 
should not observe another whom they recognize in the act of forgetting an item of personal 
property and then lay claim to the item only a moment later on the theory that it is abandoned; 
neither would it be customarily acceptable to search the contents of the item except to identify the 
owner in an attempt to return it. Even where a private actor may do so, it does not follow that 
under these circumstances that law enforcement should conclude that the objective expectation 
of privacy is abandoned. This rule would be analogous to holding that there is no expectation of 
privacy in luggage whenever it is not in the possession of the owner. 
An abuse of discretion is "against the clear weight of [the] evidence, and thus clearly 
erroneous." Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). Defendant submits that the standard 
has been met on this issue. Under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant had a subjective and 
an objective expectation of privacy in the briefcase. It is not reasonable to conclude that he had 
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abandoned it. The question of whether a warrant should have been required to search the briefcase 
should not turn on the fact that it was not in Defendant's immediate possession when Harris 
removed it to another location. 
SECOND ARGUMENT 
Under the totality of the circumstances at the relevant place and time, Officer 
Christopher Smith may have been entitled to seize the briefcase after speaking with C.R. 
England employee Carrie Johansen, but he should have obtained a search warrant before 
searching Defendant's briefcase. 
Citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy from government intrusion into their 
papers and effects. Luggage is an area in which courts have recognized a particular expectation 
of privacy. Therefore, absent an exigency, a search warrant is required for a government actor 
to search a citizen's luggage without that citizen's consent. Government agents may seize a 
container based upon reasonable suspicion, but a warrant is still required for search of that 
container. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 
(1980); United States v.Ross, 456 U.S. 789 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). 
Warrantless searches axe per se unreasonable, and the burden is on the State to show that a 
warrantless search is lawful. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). 
Although New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) disposes of the warrant requirement 
for containers found during valid automobile searches in many cases, the warrant requirement for 
other luggage still applies. 
In support of the proposition that a warrant was not required for Officer Smith to open and 
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search Defendant's briefcase at the office of C.R. England on September 20, 2002, the State has 
contended that this act was not technically a search where it did not exceed the scope of the private 
intrusion, ostensibly under United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
Defendant does not dispute that Jacobsen stands for the proposition that a government 
inspection of what a private citizen has freely made available cannot require a warrant because it 
is technically not a search where the government intrusion does not exceed the scope of the private 
intrusion, (record p. 93, paragraphs 2-5). However, Defendant does contend that Jacobsen is not 
analogous to the facts of this case and has not heretofore been correctly applied. 
Appellant distinguishes the case at bar from Jacobsen as follows: The Jacobsen Court 
relied upon the fact that the package remained open after it was damaged so that anyone could see 
that it contained a white powder. Further, the Jacobsen Court relied upon the fact that any 
inspection of the package or testing of its contents by government agents could only verify or 
refute that it contained cocaine, since the container appeared to contain cocaine and nothing else. 
In holding that there was no search, the Jacobsen Court relied upon the fact that there was no 
danger that a warrantless search could discover anything more than what was already apparent to 
any observer. See also U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
By contrast, it is obvious in the case at bar that there was a danger that a warrantless search 
could discover more than what was already apparent as demonstrated by the fact that it actually 
did discover more. Brandon Harris observed only three or four photographs before closing the 
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briefcase and giving it to his supervisor, (transcript p. 34, line 1). Carrie Johansen observed what 
she believed to be illegal pictures and an envelope with Defendant's name and a photograph of 
him before shutting the briefcase, (transcript p. 38, line 19-22; p. 39, line 11-13). Neither of these 
private actors inspected the entire contents of the luggage, as demonstrated by the fact that neither 
of them saw an enlarged photocopy of Defendant's Wyoming driver's license, as was found by 
the West Valley Police during their search, (transcript p. 163; State's Exhibit 167). Officer Smith 
also claims to have found legal adult pornography that neither private actor claimed to have seen, 
(transcript p. 54 line 2). 
In holding that there was no search in Jacobsen, the Jacobsen Court cited U.S. v. Place, 
supra as follows: 
"A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require 
opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain 
hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the 
contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this 
investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff 
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the 
fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the 
information obtained is limited." 
Jacobsen, supra, at 474. In comparing Jacobsen and Place, the Court went on to characterize 
the facts of Jacobsen as "...any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to 
characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
The State cannot correctly contend that the search of Defendant's briefcase by Officer 
Smith was not a search under Jacobsen where luggage is clearly an effect for which the warrant 
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requirement applies and the police actually discovered more contents of the container than any 
private actor had observed. Moreover, there was at the very least a danger that the government 
intrusion could have discovered more, which is the applicable test. 
THIRD ARGUMENT 
The introduction of State's Exhibit 163 and 164 at trial was not sufficiently probative 
on the issue of whether Defendant had committed the crimes charged, especially in light of 
its prejudicial effect. 
Ostensibly, the State introduced its Exhibits 163 and 164 to rebut Defendant's assertion 
that he possessed contraband materials for some purpose other than to gratify or arouse himself 
or others, (record, pp. 106, 107; 120-130; transcript pp. 126-130 ). These exhibits purported to 
be photographs of an eighteen-year-old model displaying fashions that might be associated with 
girls a few years younger than that, (transcript pp. 131; 129). 
Under State v. Dccorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), the first step of the analysis is to ask 
whether the evidence is offered for a proper non-character purpose. Defendant first contends that 
Exhibits 163 and 164 were in fact offered for a character purpose and not for a non-character 
purpose. Evidence may have a non-character purpose under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) if it 
has evidentiary value other than to show Defendant's conformity with other acts of character. 
State v. White, 880 P.2d 18 (Ut. App. 1994); State v. King, 604 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). 
In the case at bar, evidence that Defendant possessed legal pornography was used to imply 
that he possessed illegal child pornography to arouse or gratify himself. No evidence was 
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introduced to show that a person is more likely to be aroused by child pornography if they are 
aroused by adult pornography. Therefore, the jury could only draw the inference that Defendant 
was aroused by illegal child pornography because he is the kind of person who uses adult 
pornography. This is a character purpose and does not come within the scope of Rule 404(b). 
Defendant next contends that the prejudicial effect of admitting Exhibits 163 and 164 
outweighs any probative value they may have had. Prior to the motion to admit these exhibits, it 
was clear that Defendant also possessed adult pornography, based upon the testimony of Officer 
Smith and Officer Powell, (transcript p.54). Therefore, these exhibits were cumulative under 
Rule 403 as well as being prejudicial. In light of the foregoing, publishing Exhibits 163 and 164 
to the jury were unnecessary to establish the fact that Defendant possessed legal pornography, and 
the introduction only had the potential to inflame the jury's passions by confusing and misleading 
them about the nature of the issue before them. State v. Renzo, 447 P.2d 392 (Utah 1968); State 
v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979); State v. Lafferty 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). 
Showing examples of legal pornography to the jury confused the issue of why Defendant 
was on trial and mislead the jury by suggesting that it was proper to consider whether Defendant 
is simply the kind of person who uses pornography, and therefore is guilty of a crime. The 
potential for confusion and prejudice under Rule 403 is further illustrated by the State's closing 
argument inviting the jury to look through all the photos, legal and illegal, and stating, "You'll 
find they're disgusting, they're repulsive, they are simply voluminous in the amounts that are in 
there." (transcript p. 189, line 25; p. 190 lines 1-4). This argument suggests that it would be 
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proper for the jury to consider whether they found offense in materials that are not prohibited by 
law. 
Further, Defendant contends that the evidence of other acts under Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
was not scrupulously examined in the exercise of the trial court's discretion. 
FOURTH ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5a-3 is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. 
Defendant last contends that the relevant statute is overbroad on its face because under the 
interpretation set forth in State v. Morrison, 31 P.3d 547, (Utah 2001) it fails to consider whether 
Defendant may have possessed the contraband material any legitimate or lawful purpose. In 
support of his contention that the statute as interpreted is overbroad, Defendant submits that law 
enforcement personnel, attorneys, and court personnel have all possessed the same contraband 
material that Defendant has possessed, yet none would technically have a defense to doing so 
under Morrison. Likewise, it fails to consider whether his motive can or should be distinguished 
from that of law enforcement personnel, attorneys, and court personnel. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Defendant respectfully requests that this case be remanded for a new trial; that the 
evidence of the briefcase and its contents found on September 20, 2002 be suppressed, as well 
as any evidence that Defendant possessed other pornographic materials that are not unlawful. 
Further, Defendant requests that the charges against him be dismissed inasmuch as they were 
prosecuted under a statute that is overbroad. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this >^ rday of December, 2003. 2Ai8 
Stephen D. Spencer 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 401: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence. 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 402: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of 
the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible. 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 404: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character 
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered 
16 
by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in 
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, 
as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court 
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of such 
evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION IVX 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE L SECTION IVX 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
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criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENT IVX 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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ADDENDUM C 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; 
SUPPRESSION HEARING HELD MAY 7, 2003 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
PAUL B.PARKER, 5332 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
m THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, LAW, AND ORDER 
-vs-
Case No. 021911586FS, 021911269FS 
ROME HENRY MILLER m, 
Hon. Micheal K. Burton 
Defendant. 
This matter came before this court for a hearing on defendant's motions to suppress on 
May 7, 2003. Defendant was present and represented by Stephen D. Spencer. Paul B. Parker, 
Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, represented the State. The State presented 
the testimony of several witnesses: Karla Watterson, Carrie Johanson, Brandon Harris (all three 
employees of England Trucking Co.), and Chris Smith, West Valley Police Department. 
Following the evidence, both sides argued the matter. Having seen the evidence and having 
heard the witnesses' testimonies and the arguments, this court makes the following findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was a lease operator working for C.R. England Trucking. 
2. Defendant leased a truck from C.R. England Trucking. 
3. The truck was a tractor with a cab and an attached sleeper 
4. Defendant's lease was due to terminate on September 14, 2002. 
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5. Because defendant's new truck was not yet ready, the lease on defendant's old 
truck was extended a couple of days. 
6. Defendant stayed in a Motel 6 located at 1990 West North Temple during the 
several days that he awaited his new truck. 
7. Defendant signed out of the old truck and into the new track on September 19, 
2002. 
8. On September 20, 2002, Brandon Harris, a mechanic employed by C.R. England 
Trucking, got the truck from where is was parked in the C.R. England Trucking 
yard and drove it into the shop. 
9. Brandon's intent was to look the truck over and begin any needed repairs. 
10. Sometime later, defendant entered the truck and began removing his property. 
11. Brandon saw defendant using a tool of some sort to check in between the cushions 
in the sleeper. 
12. After a break, Brandon returned to the truck and found that defendant had left. 
13. Brandon entered the truck and found a brief case in the open area between the 
seats and the sleeper. 
14. C.R. England has thousands of employees. 
15. Brandon did not know defendant's name. 
16. Brandon opened the briefcase to determine who was the owner. 
17. The briefcase opened on the side and had two locks, one on each side of the 
handle. The locks were not locked. The lid was held closed with tape 
18. Brandon saw a stack of papers inside the case. 
19. The papers had pictures of nude males and females. 
20. Brandon looked through roughly one third of the papers. 
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21. Brandon saw that many of the photographs were of nude females who were 
obviously children. 
22. Brandon took the case to his supervisor who gave the briefcase to Carrie 
Johanson. 
23. Carrie looked in the case and also saw what she described as child pornography. 
It included adults and children, nude, engaged in sexual acts. 
24. Carrie closed the lid but did not close the locks or reattach the tape. 
25. Carrie called police and told the dispatcher that the briefcase contained child 
pornography. 
26. Officer Chris Smith, West Valley Police, arrived at the C.R. England lot. 
27. Officer Smith met with Carrie who showed Officer Smith the brief case. The lid 
was closed but the locks and tape were still not locked or attached. 
28. Officer Smith opened the brief case and looked through the stack of papers. 
29. Officer Smith only looked through about one quarter of the papers. 
30. Officer Smith also saw pictures of nude children some of which were engaged in 
sexual acts. 
31. Carrie was able to check records and determined that defendant had been the last 
one checked out to the truck. 
32. Carrie showed Officer Smith a photograph of defendant that she found in the brief 
case. 
33. Officer Smith began looking for defendant. Carrie assisted police by providing 
satellite information on the location of defendant's new truck. 
34. Officer Smith found the truck on the road by the C.R. England yard. Defendant 
was driving back into the business. 
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35. Officer Smith activated his emergency lights and stopped the truck. Defendant 
actually stopped inside the C.R. England yard. 
36. Officer Smith found that defendant was driving the truck and was the only person 
in the truck. 
37. Officer Smith also recognized defendant from his picture. 
38. Officer Smith arrested defendant on probable cause to believe that he had 
committed the crime of Sexual Exploitation of a Minor. 
39. Officer Smith told defendant that he was under arrest and handcuffed defendant. 
40. Officer Smith told defendant that he was under arrest for charges related to the 
child pornography. 
41. Defendant replied that the photographs were his but that they were all adults. 
42. Officers placed defendant in a nearby patrol car and then searched the inside 
defendant's new truck. The search was incident to his arrest. 
43. Subsequently, a warrant was obtained for a Motel Six room that had been rented 
to defendant but for which the rental period had expired. 
44. Defendant withdrew any challenge to the warrant itself but argued that the 
computer and camera equipment would not be relevant at the trial. 
45. Several guns were taken in a fourth search. This search was of defendant's 
personal truck that had been left at C.R. England's employee parking area. The 
State agreed that evidence of the guns would not be relevant at the trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The briefcase left in the truck, was abandoned property and therefore could no 
longer support any expectation of privacy. 
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2. The act of removing the brief case from the company truck and then opening the 
briefcase and examining its contents by C.R. England employees and then 
inviting police to look inside the case, were the actions of private citizens. 
3. Once the private citizens opened the briefcase, examined the contents and then 
left it unlocked and unseal, it no longer supported any expectation of privacy. 
4. The police action in opening the unlocked and unsealed briefcase and looking 
through its contents did not exceed the scope of the private citizens' search. 
5. Under the circumstances, the police were not required to obtain a warrant to look 
inside of the briefcase. Evidence obtained from the police search is admissible 
evidence. 
6. The information told to the dispatcher and the police officers that defendant had 
left behind a briefcase with contained nude photographs of children or child 
pornography coupled with the evidence obtained in the search of the briefcase 
was sufficient to establish probable cause to belief defendant had committed a 
felony. 
7. The stop and arrest of defendant was lawful. 
8. The search of defendant's new truck was done incident to his arrest and was 
therefore lawful. 
9. Defendant's statements to police were not made in response to any question or in 
response to any statements or actions, which were the equivalent of interrogation. 
10. Defendant's statements are admissible 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtain in the search of 
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defendant's briefcase, of his new truck and of his motel room is DENIED. Defendant's 
motion to prevent the introduction of evidence of the computer and the camera is taken 
under advisement. Defendant's motion to exclude evidence of his ownership of firearms 
found in his personal truck is GRANTED. 
DATED this 22nd day of May, 2003. 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen D. Spencer 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law, and And Order was delivered to Stephen D. Spencer, Attorney for 
Defendant Romie Henry Miller m, at 45 East Vine Street, Murray, Utah 84107 on t h e / ^ t l a y 
of May, 2003. 
jftjuii ^JYISAJLA, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a partner of Day Shell & Liljenquist L.C., and that I 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following: 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
Paul B. Parker 
231 E, 400 S. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Utah State Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 E. 300 S. 
Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Court; client 
On this day of December, 2003. 
Stephen D. Spencer 
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